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Creclit Markets, Financial Fragility,
nnd tlcc Real Economy
By Jac J. Sijben', Le Tilburg
I. Introduction
Traditionally in macroeconomic analyses it is mostly assumed that the
course of real economic development is accompanied by a smooth work-
ing of the financial system. This implies that both the financial structure
of firms and households and the operation of financial markets have no
influence on the outcome of the real economic process. With regard to
the link between the financial system and the macroeconomy Gertler and
Hubbard recently point out, "... recent research in macroeconomics -
both theoretical and empirical - has resurrected the idea that capital
market imperfections may be significant factors in business volatility by
making new progress in characterizing the mechanisms."1 This new lit-
erature borrows heavily from the economics of information and incen-
tives to explicitly motivate frictions in capital markets.
In standard classical, Keynesian and monetarist models the importance
of the money stock in the interaction processes between the financial
and real sector of the economy is emphasized. It is the money stock as a
key financial variable which is influencing both the size and the course
of economic activity. In this context Blanchard and Fischer remark,
"Despite the complexity and sophistication of the financial markets, they
are typically represented in macroeconomic models by only two variab-
les: the money stock and the interest rate".Z Therefore in the standard
models attention is focused on the liability-side of the banks' balance
sheets because changes in bank deposits impinge directly and indirectly
(through changing interest rates) on aggregate spending. This implies
' The author is Professor of Monetary Economics at Tilburg University and'the
Post-graduate School Financial Economic Management, Tilbutg, The Netherlands.
1 M. Gertler, Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, August, 1988 and M. Gertler and R. Hu6-
óard, Financial factors in business fluctuations, in: Financial Market Volatility,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1968, p. 33.
Z O. Blanchard and S. Fischer, Lectures on Macroeconomics, 1989, p. 478.
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that the loan or credit-activities (reflected on the asset-side of the
balance sheet) connected with the money-creation process are omitted.
In their theoretical analyses proponents of this socalled "money view"
usually make use of the assumption of perfect information and allocative
eíficiency of fully competitive financial markets. In these circumstances
according to Walras' law mostly the credit or loan market is eliminated.
Flowever in the last decade a new view came about which emphasizes
that financial markets and especially the creciit-activities of financial
intermediaries play a crucial role in the theory of corporate finance as
well as in monetary macroeconomics. In this field of research the authors
base their víew on empirical studies with regard to the impact both of
financial variables during the Great Depression in the thirties and the
increased fragility of the US-financial institutions in the eighties.3 In
this context Blanchard and Fischer point out, "... the interest rate alone
does not adequately reflect the links between financial markets and the
rest of the economy. Rather, it is argued, the availability of credit and
the quality of balance sheets are important determinants of investment.4
This essay deals with a non-technical review of the current issues in
the international literature about the impact both of credit markets and
financial fragility on the real economy. Special attention will be given to
the influence of the working of the credit rationing mechanism and the
development of the financial structure of firms and households and the
associated financial stability on the ultimate course of the economic
process. This view, concentrating on the independent influence of the
amount and availability of credit on economic activity, is called the
"credit view ". Since the early eighties owing to the arise of the econom-
ics of information both competing views have led to increased attention
given to the supply and especially to the quality of loans as important
determinants of national income. Economic theory must also examine
how borrowers are able to fulfill their loan-commitments and the eco-
nomic consequences of systematically induced failures to meet them.5
~ B. Bernanke, Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation
o[ the Great Depression, The American Economic Review, May 1981 and F. Mish-
kin, The household balance sheet and the Great Depression, Journal of Economic
History, December, 1978 and M. Wolfson, The causes of financial instability, The
Post Keynesian Journal ot Economics, Spring 1990.
~ O. B[anchardand S. Fischer, op. cit. 1989, p. 478.
s In this context see B. Friedmnn, Monetary policy with a credit aggregate tar-
get, in Money, monetary policy and financial institutions, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 1983, and B. Bernanke and A. Blinder, Credít,
money and aggregate demand, The American Economic Review, Papers and Pro-
ceedings, May, 1988.
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In section two a short summary will be presented of the traditional
views about the interaction between the financial structure of corpora-
tions and households and real economic development. Subsequently sec-
tion three deals with the endogenous cyclical forces that lead to financial
instability (Minsky's boom-bust cycle). In section four the modern
approach about credit markets and aggregate economic activity will be
presented. This analysis is based on the concept of asymmetric informa-
tion on these markets, with special reference to the impact of credit
rationing on macroeconomic performance.e Section five examines the
impact of the increased financial fragility in the last decade, character-
ized by a deterioration of the balance sheets of corporations and deposi-
tory institutions, on macroeconomic stability.' Finally section six conclu-
des with some summarizing remarks.
II. Traditional Views
The idea about the interrelationship between the financial structure of
firms and households and the business cycle dates from the Great
Depression in the thirties. That decade was characterized by fails of
banks and firms on the one side and by a substantial reduction of eco-
nomic activity and a concomitant strong increase of unemployment on
the other side. This environment gave economists incentives to study the
relation mentioned before. In this context Fisher emphasized that the
depression was also caused by the poor working of financial markets. He
pointed out that the real economic process in the thirties was affected by
the increased debt-financing during the upswing of the cycle in the
twenties. He puts forward, "... they (debts) were great enough to not
only "rock the boat" but to start it capsizing".s In his pathbreaking
publication he emphasized that a reduction of the amount of credit
e A. Blireder and J. Stiglitz, Money, credit constraints and economic activity,
The American Economic Review, May 1983, B. Bernanke and M. Gertler, Finan-
cial fragility and economic pertormance, NBER, Working Paper, 2318, 1987, B.
Greemoaid, J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, Informational imperfections in the capital mar-
ket and macroeconomic Iluctuations, The American Economic Review, May, 1984,
B. Friedman, Implications of increasing corporate indebtedness for monetary pol-
icy, Occasional paper 29, Group of Thirty, New York, 1989 and J. Stiglitz, Money,
credit and business íluctuations, NBER Working Paper, 2823, January, 1989.
~ H. Bockelmann and C. Borio, Financial instability and the rea] economy, De
Economist, nr. 4, 1990. See also M. Feidstein, Reducing the risk of economic crisis,
NBER Working Paper, 3620, February, 1991.
8 1. Fisher, The debt-deflation theory of Great Depressions, Econometrica,
October, 1933, p. 341. See also M. Gert[er, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
August, 1988, op. cit. p. 561.
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during the depression is endogenously. Fisher underlines that during the
upturn of the business cycle and during the subsequent depression two
dominant factors are very crucial, namely excessive debt-financing and
deflation respectively. At some time during the cycle firms and house-
holds will not be able to fulfill their contractual interest payments and
redemptions. Then, according to Fisher, a chain of reactions will emerge
featured by a redemption. This will be realized by forced sales of stocks
and other assets.e Subsequently the proceeds of these liquidations of
assets will be used to redeem bank-loans, generating a reduction of the
money stock (M). Owing to the precautionary motive the velocity of cir-
culation of money (V) also reduced. Next, according to the quantity
theory, the contraction of the aggregate demand (MV) will start a price-
deflation process. In consequence the real debt of firms will increase and
their net worth will fall giving rise to bankruptcies. This process will be
accompanied with a decline of profits and a concomitant fall of invest-
ments and increasing unemployment. Finally the confidence of consum-
ers will also be affected, causing a further reduction of expenditures and
a sharpening of the recession. In this context Carter points out, "In a
worst case scenario, with no lender of last resort intervention to increase
liquidity and restore faith in the ability of financial institutions to honor
commitment, bank runs and panic sales of assets bring on full-blown
debt deflation".to
The crux of the financial crisis is the combination of an excessive
debt-financing and a deflationary process which intensify mutually. For
the price-deflation process causes an increase of the real debts which is
strengthening the necessity of debt-redemption and so the deflationary-
process endogenously. A sharp deflation transfers wealth from borrowers
to creditors which causes a deterioration in business' firms net worth. A
similar weakening of the balance sheets of consumers led them to reduce
their spending. Fisher calculated that in March 1933 the real debt-
burden increased by 40 0~0 owing to the strong reduction of prices and the
fall of economic activity. He called the described process the deót-deJla-
tion spiral.
Also the strong fall of the money stock played a crucial role during the
depression. At that time Fisher clearly pointed out that the crash on the
stock-exchange in 1929 might have been occurred without causing a
deep depression. In his opinion the Federal Reserve as lender of last
9!. Fisher, Econometrica, October, 1933, op. cit. p. 342.
1o M. Carter, Financial innovation and financial fragility, Journal of Economic
Issues, September, 1989, p. 782.
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resort should have stopped both the fall of the money stock and the price
level by adding liquidity to the financial markets. The reduction of the
velocity of money or the increased demand for real balances was encour-
aged by the loss of confidence of economic agents and the growing bank-
ruptcies in the economy.
In a stimulating as,ymmetric information analysis of the Great Depres-
sion Bernanke puts forward that during the period 1930 - 1933 not only
the sharp fall of the money stock but also the increasing cost of credit
intermediation and the availability of credit determined the course of the
business cycle. In this context he states, "I define the cost of credit inter-
mediation (CCI) as being the cost of channeling funds from the ultimate
savers-lenders into the hands of good borrowers. The CCI includes screen-
ing, monitoring, and accounting costs, as well as the expected losses
inflicted by bad borrowers".11 The great number of defaults of banks
and firms gives incentives to the banks to reallocate their loan-portfo-
lios, preferring liquid and high-qualified assets. Moreover the confidence
in the banking system was impaired, giving rise to a"run on the banks"
by depositors sharpening the financial crisis. This process resulted in a
squeezing of credit to households, farmers, and small firms and in a fur-
ther fall of economic activity. Bernanke points out, "As the real costs of
intermediation increased, some borrowers found credit to be expensive
and difficult to obtain. The effects of thls credit squeeze on aggregate
demand helped convert the severe but not unprecedented downturn of
1929 - 1930 into a protracted recession."lZ Also the fact that the spread
between interest rates for low versus high-quality borrowers remained
so high for so long indicates that asymmetric information problems were
severe in this period.
After the second world-war the standard Keynesian analysis did not
give attention explicitly to the working of financial markets in explaining
the development of economic activity. In this analysis the bond-credit-
and stockmarkets are aggregated in such a way that one rate of interest
emerges. Investment behaviour of entrepreneurs is determined especially
by confidence and shifting moods of optimism or pessimism (animal spir-
its) and to a lesser degree by financial considerations. The confidence
refers on the one side to the expectational view of the investor-borrower
with regard to the future returns of the investment project and on the
ii B. Bernanke, The American Economic Review, June, 1983, op. cit. p. 263.
~~ B. Bernanke, The American Economic Review, June, 1983, op. cit. p. 257. In
this context see also F. Mishkin, Asymmetric information and financial crises: A
historical perspective, NBER Working Faper, no. 3400, p. 24 - 25.
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other side to the expectations of the saver-lender with regard to the ful-
filment of the loan-contract of the potential borrower. Keynes put for-
ward that a loss of confidence either by the lender or by the borrower
could be sufficient to generate a fall in economic activity. A[terwards in
the Keynesian IS-LM models the relationship between financial markets
and the real economy is accomplished by the rate of interest as the cost-
of-capital channel. However, ultimately it is still the money stock as a
key financial variable that is emphasized, neglecting the explicit work-
ing of credit markets.
In the fifties and sixties in monetary economics attention shifted grad-
ually to the controversy between Keynesians and monetarists (Friedman
c.s), focusing on the transmission channels between changes in the
money supply and economic activity. Keynesians were emphasizing the
multiplier-accelerator mechanism and fiscal policy in explaining the
development of national income. Based on the (new) classical theory the
monetarists were underlining the relation between the money supply and
the course of national income. Friedman and Schwartz put forward that
this relation had been very important during the Great Depression.
Since the start of the downturn in the business cycle in 1929 until the
deep trough in 1933 the money stock as well as economic activity re-
duced sharply. They stress the importance of banking panics because
they view them as a major source of contractions in the money supply. In
this context Friedman has pointed out very clearly that just in this
period the impact of the money stock on the business cycle has been
proved. After all he also neglected the influence of the operation of
financial markets during the process of the economic-downturn.13 In his
further publications he emphasized the meaning of money as a medium
of exchange and as an asset, giving particular attention to the special
role of banks as money-creating institutions. This implies that the liabi-
lity-side of the banks were centred and that the asset-side (loans) of
banks and other financial intermediaries were kept in the background.
In the postwar period Gurley and Shaw revitalized the research on the
interaction between the operation of financial markets and real eco-
nomic development. These authors were emphasizing the financial-inter-
mediation process in developed and underdeveloped economies, with spe-
cial reference to the meaning of non-bank financial intermediaries in the
savings-investment process for the course of economic activity. Accord-
ing to their view it is not only the money supply created by commercial
is M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States,
1867 - 1960, Princeton, 1963.
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banks which is the driving force of aggregate demand in the economy,
but also the socalled "near monies" issued by non-bank financial inter-
mediaries." At times of credit squeeze the supply of these interest-bear-
ing liquid assets will be increased by these intermediaries, weakening
the effectiveness of monetary policy. (substitution-hypothesis). The ac-
tivities of the non-bank financial intermediaries influence the liquidity
preferences of economic agents, and so lead to a mare intensive use
being made of the existing money supply. This means increasing the
income circulation of money, making it harder for the central bank to
regulate expenditures in the economy.15 Also the well-known Radcliffe-
report in 1959 stressed that from a theoretical viewpoint, the money
stock is not the only strategic variable in monetary policy but the overall
liquidity supply in the economy. This implies that the volume of aggre-
gate demand has become increasingly dependent of factors unrelated to
the scope of changes in the money supply. If there is some proportion-
ality between money and liquid assets in the economy, then the money-
liquid-assets spending analysis will yield the same ultimate results as
the simple money-spending approach underlying the orthodoxe case. In
modern industrialized countries a strong proliferation of financial insti-
tutions has come about, especially in the eighties, which has created a
substantial amount of interest-bearing liquid assets, blurring the ortho-
doxe money-definition and weakening the effectiveness of monetary
policy.le
Gurley and Shaw also emphasized the importance of the total borrow-
ing-capacity of economic agents with regard to macroeconomic expen-
ditures. In other words the availability of credit is a variable which has
a dominant impact on aggregate demand and macroeconomic perform-
ance. On the other hand the quality of the balance sheets of firms and
households, so the financial structure of the economic subjects, deter-
mines to what extent this capacity can be used and will also influence
the business cycle (Fisher's debt-deflation approach). In this context the
financial intermediaries play a crucial role because their credit-activities
(asset-side) determine the availability of credit in the economy. These
i~ J. Gurley and E. Shaw, Money in a Theory ot Finance, 1960. See also J. Cur-
Iey and E. Shaw, Financial Aspects of Economic Development, The American Eco-
nomic Review, 1955, p. 515 - 538.
is J. Sijben, Near-banking and monetary policy, Economic Quarterly Review,
Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank NV, December, 1972, p. 1- 14.
~s This view is of current interest owing to the wave of financial innovation pro-
cesses in the last decade. See in this context, J. Sijben, Financial innovations,
monetary policy and financial stability, Kredit und Kapital, March, 1988,
p. 45 - 67.
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institutions take care of an efficient allocation of savings and invest-
ments in the economy through indirect external finance. In this way a
greater amount of credit will be available and on more favourable terms
than through the rather ínefficient direct external finance process by the
capital market. Later on the Gurley-Shaw approach about the relevancy
of the working of financial markets has been elaborated in the economic
literature resulting in the incorporation of financial sectors (portfolio-
approach) in macroeconomic models.l'
It strikes that at the end of the fifties Modigliani and Miller in their
well-known publication of 1958 just pointed out that under certain, very
restrictive, conditions (no taxes and transaction costs, no default-risk
and perfect capital markets) capital-decision making is independent of
the financial structure of the firm. Since almost no attention was given
in this neo-classical frictionless world to possible financial problems
with regard to the firm's capital investments, a smooth working of the
financial system was assumed (perfect and efficient markets and symme-
tric information) without any impediment in realizing investment pro-
jects. In this context Greenwald and Stiglitz remark, "The classical
Modigliani-Miller approach to financial policy concluded that the finan-
cial structure of a firm was irrelevant to both its value and its operating
decisions, and the neoclassical theory of the firm assumed further that
its financial position was irrelevant.la
This idea resulted in a macroeconomic approach which unambiguously
shifted attention again to the money stock as the key financial variable
in the real-financial interaction process. This view also supported
Friedman's plea to control the money-supply process aiming at a stabili-
zation of economic activity on the one hand and his proposition that the
money supply is the driving force behind the development of national
income on the other hand. The control of the money supply is also a cen-
tral issue both in the rational expectations theory in the seventies and in
the game-theoretic approach in monetary policy in the eighties (rules
versus discretion debate). According to the rational expectations hypo-
thesis only unexpected monetary changes with its concomitant surprise
tT J. Tobin, Money, capital and other stores of value, The American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1961 and J. Tobin, A general equilibrium
approach to monetary theory, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February,
1969. In this context see also J. Sijben, Money and Finance: a blurring of disci-
plines, Tilburg University Press, 1986.
le B. Greenwald and J. Stiglitz, Asymmetric in[ormation and the new theory of
the firm: financial constraints and risk-behaviour. The American Economic
Review, May, 1990.
Credit Markets, Financial Fragility, and the Real Economy 489
inflation will generate alterations in real economic activity (Lucas-Sar-
gent-Wallace ineffectiveness hypothesis). In the game-theoretic approach
the interaction process between the strategic behaviour of the policy-
maker and the rational public is emphasized. This implies that a discre-
tionary policy has to be abandoned, because the long-run outcomes in
terms of inflation and employment will be less beneficial (Nash-equili-
brium) than in the case of a precommitment in monetary policy (rule).to
III. Minsky's Boom-bust Cycle
The overheated economy of the late 1960s and a significant increase in
the use of debt, much of it lent by banks and other depository institu-
tions, the credit crunch of 1966 and the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970
encouraged some authors to study the stability of the financial system in
the industrialized countries. Minsky and Kindleberger picked up Fisher's
debt-deflation spiral to revitalize the meaning of the financial structure
of firms and households for financial stability and the possible spill-over
effects to the real econom,y. This section deals with a short review of
Minsky's financial instability-hypothesis, because his analysis can be
used as a connecting-link with the modern theory about the importance
of asymmetric information on credit markts both for the financial struc-
ture and the real economic process.
Minsky emphasizes that the capitalist system is characterized by a
"financial instability bias", manifesting by rapid and accelerating chan-
ges in prices of real and financial assets in relation to prices of produc-
tion.20 The socalled "boom-bust-cycie" in which endogenous cyclical
forces may lead to financial instability goes along the following line of
reasoning. During the upswing in economic activity firms and house-
holds behave in such a way that they don't bother about the development
of their financial structure. Owing to a short memory economic agents
have less aversion to building-up debts and to an increasing relation
between debts and liquid assets. However this behaviour makes the
financial system rather vulnerable to possible disturbances in the real
is J. Sijben, Rational expectations and monetary policy, Sythoff and Noordhoff,
Germantown, Maryland, 1980 and J. Sijben, Monetary policy in a game-theoretic
framework, Jahrbitcher filr National'dkonomie und Statistik, September, 1J92,
p. 233 - 253.
zo H. Minsky, Capitalist financial processes and the instability of capitalism,
Journal of Economic Issues, June, 1980. See also E. Davis, Instability in the euro-
markets and the economic theory of financial crisis, Bank of England, Economics
Division, October, 1989.
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economy. In this context Minsky distinguishes three kinds of economic
agents.21 At first the hedge-finance units which are in a financial posi-
tion characterized by expected profits exceeding the expected obliga-
tions connected with debt-financing. In all periods there is an increase
of net-wealth. Secondly, the speculative-finance units featured by a
financial position by which in the beginning the debt-services exceed the
expected returns, but later on the reverse case holds. It is obvious that
net-wealth of these agents is very sensitive to interest rate movements.
On the other hand owing to the ever-recurring refinancing of the debt
the agents are strongly dependent of a smooth working of the financial
system. Finally, the speculative or Ponzi-finance units who are confront-
ed with long periods in which the contractual repayments are exceeding
cash-flows. They are obliged to increase their outstanding debts contin-
uously until at the end a very substantial income flow can be used to pay
off the accumulated debts. Obviously the financial structure of this
group of economic agents is especially sensitive to sharp increases of the
rate of interest. In this context Carter points out, "In Ponzi financing,
income flows are not sufficient even to cover interest on outstanding
debt so the refinancing necessarily entails an increase in indebtedness.
The proliferation of speculative and Ponzi financing arrangements gen-
erates a fragile financial structure in which any sharp rise in interest
rates will generate present value reversals, impairing the ability of firms
to refinance investment projects in process and their willingness to
undertake new investment".zz
The boom-bust cycle with the different stages of financing can be de-
scribed as follows. At the start of the economic upswing hedge-finance
units will dominate, increasing the prices of capital assets and so invest-
ment activity. In this context Minsky remarks, "An increase in the
demand price for capital assets relative to the supply prices of invest-
ment output increases investment, which increases not only profits but
also the amount of financing available from banks and financial markets
" z3 According to Tobin's-q mechanism the price of existing capital
goods (equities) will exceed the reproduction costs of new investment
goods increasing investment activity. The induced fall of the required
rate of return will increase both the investment in reproducible real
capital and profits, giving incentives to speculative-finance. Therefore
zi H. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, 1986. See atso M. Carter, Jour-
nal of Economic Issues, September, 1989, op. cit. p. 781 - 782.
zz M. Carter, Journal of Economic Issues, September, 1989, op. cit. p. 782.
z3 H. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, 1986, New Haven, op. cit.
p. 228.
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tlie ratio of debts to income and liquid assets respectively will rise. This
implies that more economic agents will become dependent on an ever-
recurring claim on financial markets to finance their assets, weakening
their financial structure.
The fragility of the financial system also increases when relative small
changes in cash-flows, the discount rate and contractual repayments are
influencing negatively the fulfilment of the financial obligations. Minsky
argued that in a situation of increasing debt-financing it will be more
difficult to meet these debt service requirements if there is a down-turn
in the economic cycle with a concomitant reduction of income-flows.
Therefore "hedge-finance-units" become "speculative-finance units" and
these agents find difficulty in refinancing their debts. Moreover the rate
of interest will rise because of a higher demand for credit, increasing the
riskiness of credit-extension. Next the rise of the rate of interest will
increase the reproduction costs of new capital goods and, according to
Tobin's q-mechanism, will further reduce investment activity. On the
other hand the rise of the rate of interest will result in a fall of the price
of existing capital goods (equities) or in a higher required rate of return
also reducing investment activity. Finally this adjustment process genera-
tes the well-known Fisher' debt-deflation spiral (section 2).
Minsky puts forward that since the sixties during periods of a restric-
tive monetary policy in the United States the US-economy was brought
to the brink of a debt-deflation process. If in these circumstances a
financial crisis threatens, the central bank as lender of last resort can
help to avoid the debt-deflation spiral. Through a large addition of liqui-
dity to financial markets and the associated fall of interest rates a fur-
ther fall of the price of equities and so of investment activity can be
averted. However he argued that since the sixties, according to the Key-
nesian receipt, a downturn in economic activity and income-flows has
been prevented by a discretionary expansive fiscal policy at the price of
higher inflation. (inflationary bias). He expresses this view as follows,
"Stagflation is truly a result of big government, but so is the absence of
a deep depression in the years since 1966. There is no free lunch: we
have eliminated deep depressions but the price has been first chronic
and now accelerating inflation".24 The intervention of the central bank
will reduce the fear of a further fall of profits and prevents the loss of
confidence with economic agents. Then Minsky concludes, "Both the
Great Depression and the great inflation and intermittent stagnation of
Z~ N. Minsky, Journal of Economic Issues, June, 1980, op. cit. p. 519.
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1966 - 1979 are symptoms of the underlying instability of capitalism. A
great stagflation is the outcome when government is big and the central
bank intervenes force-fully".Zs
Monetary authorities can control this process of endogenous financial
instability of the capitalist system as described above by supervising the
money-supply process of the commercial banks. Moreover they also need
to superintend the capital adequacy ratio of these banks during the up-
swing in the cycle to guard against insolvency. In this way the confidence
of a smooth working of financial markets can be maintained even if a
negative shock might occur. However firms always can step aside and
will try to obtain credit from other financial intermediaries which are
not supervised by the central bank. Besides in a strong financially inte-
grated world, high qualified corporations can always tap foreign finan-
cial markets to finance their investment projects. In this way the process
of weakening the financial structure of the tirms can proceed impairing
the stability of the financial system. There is also the problem of moral
hazard. The success of the safety-net of the central bank may be encour-
aging financial institutions to accept more risky-projects because they
feel that public policy is oriented toward preventing significant adverse
consequences. From a monetary policy perspective the increased indeb-
tedness of US-corporations during the last decade can increase the risk
that sluggish growth could lead to recession, generating widespread and
potentially cumulative debt defaults. In this context Friedman points
out, "Instead this experience suggests that if enlarged business indebted-
ness raises the likely costs of economic downturn and the risks associ-
ated with them, and hence makes policymakers less likely to accept such
periods of economic weakness, it therefore also imparts an inflationary
bias ..., this bias is likely to meet less resistance than would have been
the case some years ago".28 This approach corrésponds with Minsky's
view described above that if the financial system has become too fragile
to withsiand any but the shortest recession, it is unlikely to be able to
support a genuine attack on inflation.
Summarizing it may be concluded that since Fisher's publication in
1933 many economists have given attention to the importance both of the
operation of financial markets and financial stability for the course of
real economic activity. However the interaction process between the real
Zs H. Minsky, Journal ot Economic Issues, June, 1980, op. cit. p. 520. See also
M. WolJson, T'he Post Keynesian Journal of Economics, Spring, 1990, p. 333 - 355.
Zs B. Friedman, Occasional Paper 29, Group of Thirty, New York, 1989, op. cit.
p. 33.
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and the financial side ot the economy still remained to be determined by
the development of the money stock and the rate of interest as the key
financial variables.
In the next two sections a non-technical overview will be presented of
the modern approaches about the working of the credit market and its
importance for financial stability and macroeconomic performance.
These sections deal with the role of the economics of information with
regard to imperfections on the credit market, the credit-rationing mecha-
nism, the quality of the banks' balance sheets, the associated financial
structure of firms and the possible spill-over effects to the real economy.
In an economic downturn defaults in the non-financial sector of the econ-
omy can deteriorate confidence and the creditworthiness of the banking
system which finally may result in bankruptcies. In these circumstances
banks will be reluctant to increase their loan-portfolio. Then according
to the credit view aggregate demand will be reduced further weakening
real economic activity. This phenomenon known as a credit crunch is
sometimes called a capital crunch.27 In this context Bockelmann and
Borio point out, "When the solvency of intermediaries is affected, the
consequences for real activity are potentially more damaging, especially
when banks are involved, ... this crisis forces a reduction of bank-credit.
Since most small and medium size firms do not have access to alterna-
tive sources of finance the "credit crunch" can reduce spending",ze
IV. Asymmetric Information and Credit Markets
1. The Lemon's Principle
In a pathbreaking publication Akerlof introduced the issue of the
importance of agent's uncertainty with regard to the quality of goods for
the working of the market mechanism. He puts forward that buyers are
using some market variable to judge the quality of the goods they intend
to buy in the future. At the same time sellers have an incentive to offer
lower qualified goods because the proceeds of the higher qualified goods
will mainly accrue to the whole group of sellers and not to the individual
seller. For there doesn't exist a classification of qualities of goods traded
z~ R. Syron, Are we experiencíng a Credit Crunch?, New England Economic
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, July - August, 1991.
zs H. Bockelmann and C. Borio, De Economist, 1990, op. cit. p. 443. See also B.
Bernanke and C. Lown, The Credit Crunch, Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-
ity, nr. 2, 1991.
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and one uniform price will be effected on the market. Therefore there
exists a tendency to reduce both the average quality of the goods sup-
plied and the size of the market. He illustrates this idea with the help of
used-cars. He points out that asymmetric information exists between
buyers and sellers on the market for cars in such a way that the seller
has more information about the quality of the cars than the buyer. In
this context Akerlof remarks, "But good cars and bad cars must still sell
at the same price since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference
between a good and a bad car".29 It is obvious that the used-car has not
the same value as a new car. Otherwise it would be beneficial to sell a
bad car (lemon) at the price of a new car and afterwards to buy a new
car with a higher chance of a high quality. According to Akerlof this
means, "Thus the owner of a good machine must be locked in. Not only
is it true that he cannot receive the true value of his car, but he cannot
even obtain the expected value of a new car".30 Owing to the uniform
price for all qualities the owners of used-cars have the incentive only to
supply the bad cars (lemons) on the market (adverse selection). Under
certain circumstances even it seems possible that the market of used-
cars ceases to exist. In this way there is some analogy with the well-
known Gresham's law "bad money drives out good money". Owners of
good cars don't like to pay for the bad-ones and will prefer not to sell. In
this context Akerlof remarks, The "bad" cars tend to drive out the
"good", and further, "bad cars drive out the good because they sell at
the same price as good cars. But the bad cars sell at the same price as
good cars, since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between
a good and a bad car; only the seller knows"" From the foregoing it
appears that the lemon's principle implies that prices not only perform
the traditional allocation function in the market process but also render
an information content with regard to the quality,of the goods traded on
the market.
Akerlof's message is emphasizing that because of asymmetric informa-
tion between buyer and seller on the market the supplier of the low qual-
ified goods receives a lemons premium at the cost of those who supply
high qualified goods at the same price. Next Akerlof points out that
ultimately because of the working of the lemons principle and the opera-
tion of the associated market processes the market concerned ceases to
exist. He expresses this sequential process as follows, "For it is quite
ZQ G. AkerloJ, The market for "lemons": quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1970, p. 189.
3o G. Akerlof, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1970, op. cit. p. 489.
3t G. Akerlof, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1970, op. cit. p. 490.
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possible to have the bad driving out the not-so-bad driving out the
medium driving out the not-so-good driving out the good in such a
sequence of events that no market exists at all."'Z
2. Credit Rationing
Recently in economic literature the lemon's principle and the associated
asymmetric information has been applied to the operation of financial
markets, especially to explain the phenomenon of credit rationing and
the importance of the financial structure of economic agents for real eco-
nomic development. The asymmetric information approach provides an
important transmission mechanism for how disturbances on credit mar-
kets affect aggregate economic activity. This approach assumes that the
borrower is better informed about the credit-risk than the lender, thè
financial institution concerned. Because of the fact that a priori the
identity of the pool of heterogeneous borrowers can not be determined
the market rate of interest, so the price of credit, incorporates a lemon's-
premium. This implies that in these circumstances borrowers with a low
risk will subsidize the high-risk borrowers. However based on the prin-
ciple of adverse selection they will not be prepared to pay this relative
high price, change their behaviour and will leave the bank.
The last few years in international literature about the economics of
information or the new microeconomics much attention has been given
to the issue of asymmetric information and the connected strategical
market behaviour of economic agents. This new approach tries to
explain the existence of disequilibrium prices and has been applied to
the price-setting processes on the labour market (efficiency wages, insi-
der-outsider problem) and the market for goods. However recently this
new view has also been applied to the operation of the credit market,
emphasizing the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard resulting
in quantity adjustments on this market. The reasoning goes as follows.
Because of asymmetric information the lender will be confronted with a
heterogeneous group of borrowers which a priori he cannot divide in
several risk-classes. This means that the pool of potential borrowers is
completely different manifesting itself in a different chance of repay-
ment of the loan. Analogous to Akerlof's lemon's problem a higher rate of
interest (price of credit), applying to all borrowers, gives an incentive to
the high-qualified borrower to leave the market while the low-qualified
ones will remain. In this way the average degree of risk-aversion in the
32 G. AkerloJ, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1970, op. cit. p. 490.
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remaining pool of potential borrowers will be lowered. Next to this so-
called adverse selection effect a higher rate of interest will stimulate
individual borrowers to undertake more risky investment projects, with
a higher default-risk but with higher returns if these projects appear to
be successful. This incentive effect is called moral hazard.
This market behaviour will result in a fall of the average quality of the
borrowers, so possibly deteriorating the quality of the assets of the bank-
ing system. The high-qualified borrowers will look for alternative sour-
ces of finance like direct external financing on the capital market (see
section 2). This reaction is called disintermediation or securitisation,
characterized by a replacement of the traditional bank loans by market-
able securities. In this context Oort points out, "This process of disinter-
mediation may leave the banks with only the weaker credits on their
balance sheets, thus increasing their wlnerability".33 It may be con-
cluded that in an asymmetric information framework on the loan market
a rise of the rate of interest may have the following results. On the one
hand a positive impact on the returns of the bank and on the other hand
a negative influence through a deterioration of the quality of the banks'
assets. lf the last adverse selection effect dominates it will not be benefi-
cial for the lender to increase further the loan-rate although an excess
demand for loans may still exist. In these circumstances the rate of inter-
est has lost its traditional market clearing function and a new allocation
mechanism has to be introduced.
The possible negative results according to the operation of the lemon's
principle will disappear when the lender will be able to eliminate the
underlying asymmetric information by establishing the real identity and
the quality of the borrower. In this context Stiglitz and Weiss remark,
"It is difficult to identify "good borrowers" and to do so requires the
bank to use a variety of screening devices".3~ The bank can offer differ-
ent loan-contracts to the heterogeneous pool of borrowers (combina-
tions of amount of credit, rate of interest, collateral etc.). In this way a
sorting-out mechanism will be introduced to find out the differences of
wants between high and low-qualified borrowers aiming at a tailor-
made loan-contract. Another way to eliminate the asymmetric informa-
a3 C. Oort, The impact of the quality of debt for the vulnerability of the interna-
tional banking system, in J. Sijóen ed. Financing the world economy in the nine-
ties, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988, p. 82 - 83.
3~ J. Sliglitz and A. Weíss, Credit rationing in markets with imperfect informa-
tion, The American Economic Review, June, 1981, p. 393. See also J. Stiglitz and
A. Weiss, Banks as social accountants and screening devices for the allocation of
credit, NBER Working Paper, 2710, October 1988.
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tion refers to trace the creditworthiness of the potential borrower by a
screening-process.
Greenwald and Stiglitz have stressed that the lemon's principle can led
to a reduction or sometimes even a disappearence of some markets. Prac-
tically this can mean that no or too less share-capital will be available
(equity-rationing) or that the banking system shifts to credit rationing.3fi
In these circumstances the potential borrower is committed to internal
finance. Greenwald and Stiglitz point out, "... the free access to all
forms of financing envisaged by Modigliani-Miller may not exit. In loan
markets, there may be credit rationing. In these cases financial structure
and position matter and affect firm behaviour".38 It is obvious that in
these circumstances a credit crunch can arise with spill-over effects to
the real economy resulting in a contraction of economic activity.
The phenomenon of credit rationing is characterized by an excess
demand for loans which, given the vector of the different terms of credit,
is not satisfied by the bank. It refers to a disequilibrium situation
because neither an increase of the rate of interest nor a strengthening of
non-interest terms can eliminate this excess demand. Disequiliórium
credit rationing arises when there are temporary obstacles to the imme-
diate adjustment of loan rates to clear the credit market because of
government intervention in financial markets (interest rate or loan ceil-
ings). Hodgeman has tried to explain this phenomenon by relating it to
the risk of default of payment. Based on the assumption that both lender
and borrower have the same information with regard to the risk of
default, the risk will be reflected in the rate of interest.37 Next Freimer
and Gordon have attempted to find out why under certain circumstances
banks like to give priority to quantity-adjustments through credit ration-
ing above price-adjustments through an increase of the loan rate. They
conclude that the rational lender will equal the repayment of the loan to
the best possible outcome of an investment project. Actually this means
that a cut-off condition exists in such a way that an increase of the loan
35 J, Stiglitz, Markets, market failures and development, The American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1989, and S. Myers and N. Majluf,
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that
ínvestors do not have, Journal o[ Financial Economics, June 1984. See also D.
JaJfee and J. Stigíitz, Credit Rationing, in Handbook of Monetary Economics,
volume 2, eds. B. Friedman and F. Hahn, North-Holland, 1990.
3s B. Greenwald and J. Stig(itz, Asymmetric information and the new theory of
the firm: financial constraints and risk behaviour, The American Economic
Review, May, 1990, op. cit. p. 160.
3~ D. Hodgeman, Credit risk and credit rationing, The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, May, 1960.
38 Kredit und Kapild 1~1993
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rate will give no further contribution to the improvement of the lender's
position. It also implies that different expectations of lenders and bor-
rowers with regard to the risk of default and bankruptcy may give rise
to a divergent behaviour of agents on the loan market.38
As was described before the modern literature on game-theory and
asymmetric information has introduced the issues of adverse selection
and moral hazard which can explain the non-convential operation of the
credit market and the associated credit rationing. These phenomena will
arise when the loan rate influences borrower's behaviour (moral hazard)
or determines the riskiness of the potential borrowers (adverse selection).
It is obvious that the lender-borrower relation built-up in the past
(reputation) will also play a role in the decision process with regard to
credit rationing. When the borrower has built-up a high credit-reputa-
tion, reducing the asymmetric information, then a kind of implicit con-
tract will emerge. This view refers to Okun's distinction between auction
and customers markets.39 This implies that the lender will ration a bor-
rower that has a good reputation with regard to his contractual obliga-
tions less easily than an unknown and more risky borrower. Therefore
the credibility of the financial contract between lender and borrower is
very important.
After the traditional temporary disequilibrium-rationing-analysis
Stiglitz and Weiss also attempted to give a theoretical underpinning of
the more permanent equilibrium credit-rationing. They emphasize the
importance of asymmetric, not verifyable, information between lender
and borrower with regard to the possible outcomes of the investment
project. The bank is interested in the interest rate and the quality of the
loan. However, as the authors remark, "The interest rate a bank charges
may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans by either: (1) sorting
potential borrowers (the adverse selection effect) or (2) affecting the ac-
tions of borrowers (the incentive effect)".~o Both the sorting-out effect of
the rate of interest with regard to the creditworthiness of potential bor-
rowers and the incentive or moral hazard effect of the rate of interest
with regard to the borrowers' behaviour are based on Akerlof's lemon's
principle. The sorting-out mechanism through the rate of interest initial-
ly results from the bank's distrust of the creditworthiness of Lhe poten-
3e M. Freimer and M. Gordon, Why banks ration credit? The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, August, 1985.
3s A. Okun, Inflation; its mechanics and welfare costs, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, nr. 2, 1975.
~o J. Stigtitz and A. Weiss, The American Economic Review, June, 1981, op. cit.
p. 393.
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tial identical borrowers. However the bank tries to separate beforehand
the 'good' and the 'bad' borrowers and this screening-process can be
accomplished by making use of the rate of interest. Stiglitz and Weiss
assume that on the average the individual borrower who is prepared to
pay a higher loan rate can be identified as a more risky-borrower and
vice versa. This willingness results from the fact that they assess a low
chance of repayment of the loan. This means that a rise of the rate of
interest will increase the average riskiness of the loans and the chances
of bankruptcy, deteriorating the bank's profitability. It also implies that
the rate of interest incorporates information about the quality of the
loan. Moreover a rise of the rate of interest will stimulate potential bor-
rowers to offer the higher yielding, but more-risky investment projects
(moral hazard effect).
Based on asymmetric information and the concomitant monitoring
costs the bank will try to make a contract in such a way that on the one
side the potential borrowers can be identified with regard to their credit-
worthiness and that on the other side there will be no incentive to
change their behaviour that may be unprofitable for the bank. In this
context Stiglitz and Weiss speak about the bank-optimal rate (r') which
is the equilibrium rate of interest maximizing the bank's returns al-
though an excess demand for loans still exists. The bank will not be pre-
pared to make a loan to a potential borrower who is willing whether to
pay a higher rate than this optimal rate or to give more collateral. For
otherwise losses to the lender exceed gains due to higher interest income.
In these circumstances there are no market forces that will equilibrate
the market like in a Walrasian world with perfect information. Therefore
a quantity-adjustment process emerges resulting in a rationing of credit.
With regard to the optimal interest rate Stiglitz and Weiss remark, "In
the bank's judgement, such a loan is likely to be a worse risk than the
average loan at interest rate r', and the expected return to a loan at an
interest rate above r' is actually lower than the expected return to the
loans the bank is presently making"~1 (see appendix).
The analysis of Stiglitz and Weiss has given a new impetus to the tra-
ditional credit-availability doctrine. It explains the phenomenon of equi-
librium-rationing characterized by an excess demand for loans and a
backward bending supply curve. The rate of interest determines directly
the quality of the bank's loan-portfolio giving an incentive to the bank
to ration credit. With regard to the market-mechanism the authors point
4~ J. Stig[itz and A. Weiss, The American Economic Review, June, 198t, op. cit.
p. 394.
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out, "The law of Supply and Demand is not in fact a law" and further;
"It is rather a result generated by the underlying assumptions, that
prices have neither sorting nor incentive effects. The usual result of eco-
nomic theorizing: that prices clear markets, is model specific and is not a
general property of markets-unemployment and credit rationing are not
phantasms"~2 Stiglitz puts forward that already Adam Smith described
the sorting-out mechanism with regard to the creditworthiness of the
borrowers, generated by a rise of the rate of interest, as follows "... the
greater part of the money which was to be lent, would let to prodigals
and profectors. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more
than a part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not
venture into the competitioni43
3. Collateral
Apart from directly monitoring or controlling the projects of borrowers
to screen-in low risk borrowers, which may be very costly, other
methods of reducing moral hazard and adverse selection effects are avail-
able to lenders. Recently Bester has shown that in an equilibrium with
sufficient competition between the banks no credit rationing will exist.
The quality of the different borrowers can be established by using both
the collateral requirements and the rate of interest as screening-devices.
He assumes that in making the loan-contract banks make a decision
simultaneously about the level of the interest rate and the required colla-
teral.44 In this way it is possible to offer different contracts which can
perform the function of a self-selection mechanism to adequately screen-
out high risk borrowers. He shows that borrowers with a low default-
risk will sooner accept a strengthening of collateral requirements with a
concomitant reduction of the rate of interest than a borrower with a
higher risk of default. In this way the overall level of risk in the remain-
ing pool of borrowers will be lowered. Therefore in the equilibrium
situation no credit rationing will exist. His reasoning goes as follows. If
a high-risk borrower can not receive the preferred loan he has to com-
4Z J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, The American Economic Review, June, 1981, op. cit.
p. 394.
~3 J. Stiglitz, The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May,
1989, op. cit. p. 31.
~4 H. Bester, Screening versus rationing in credit markets with imperfect infor-
mation, The American Economic Review, September, 1985. In this context see also
H. Milde and J. Riley, Signalling in credit markets, The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 1988. These authors put forward that the loan size can also be used in a
similar way to collateral to screen-out high-risk borrowers.
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pete with the low risk borrowers confronted with beneficial contracts.
This implies that in an equilibrium with credit rationing a group of bad
and less-bad risks always exists. However Bester remarks, "... pooling of
different risks at one contract is not viable against competition wherever
self-selection mechanisms are available".45 He characterizes an equilib-
rium as a separation of borrowers with different risks (separating equi-
librium). High-risk borrowers will accept a contract with a higher rate
of interest and less collateral than the low-risk ones. In the equilibrium
situation it holds that the amount of collateral is negatively correlated to
the degree of risk of the borrower's investment project. This means that
the collateral requirements in the various contracts give the bank the
desired information about the risk of default of the potential borrowers.
(signalling-effect) In this context Bester points out, "... low-risk entre-
preneurs have been assumed to be able to raise a sufficient amount of
collateral to distinguish themselves of high risk ones".4e Offering differ-
ent contracts, determined by various combinations of interest rate and
collateral requirements, operates as a screening-mechanism separating
'bad' and 'good' borrowers. Under these circumstances there is no need
to make an appeal to the working of the adverse-selection effect accord-
ing to the Stiglitz-Weiss analysis.
Bester's analysis has some analogy with the game-theoretical issues of
reputation and credibility of central banks with regard to monetary
policy. To stick to the preannounced anti-inflation policy, in case of
need accepting a recession, may be sufficient to convince the public that
the central bank actually is a'hard' policy-maker. Then this signal pre-
vents a monitoring-process by the public to identify the central bank
with regard to the priority of price stability ('hard') or employment
('weak') "
In economic literature it is put forward that a change of the non-inter-
est terms of credit gives a possibility to compensate the size of ctedit
rationing. For strengthening the collateral requirements may reduce the
excess demand for credit and so the amount of credit rationing. However
more restrictive non-interest terms may also be a kind of credit ration-
ing, owing to the fact that these stronger requirements will be used to
reduce the availability of funds. Irrespective of the view one is defend-
ing, it can be stated that a change of the non-interest terms of credit
~s H. Bester, The American Economic Review, September, 1985, op. cit. p. 850.
4e H. Bester, The American Economic Review, September, 1985, op. cit. p. 854.
See in this context also Ch. Goodhart, Money, lnformation and uncertainty, Chap-
ter 7, 1989, p. 188 - 176.
~~ J. Sijben, Jahrbilcher filr NationaltSkonomle und Statistlk, September, 1992.
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and the associated credit rationing will operate as a transmission chan-
nel in monetary policy, without changing the rate of interest. In this con-
text Stiglitz and Weiss remark, "Note that in a rationing equilibrium to
the extent that monetary policy succeeds in shifting the supply of funds,
it will affect the level of investment, not through the interest rate mecha-
nism, but rather through the availability of credit".~" The spill-over
effect of the credit market to the goods market and aggregate demand is
the crux of the credit rationing mechanism. However, as was already
mentioned in section 3, in a strong financially integrated world, high
qualified borrowers can always raise funds on foreign financial markets
weakening the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy.
4. Financial Structure
In the context of credit rationing by banks the last few years much
attention has also been given to the important role of the financial
structure of economic agents for macroeconomic performance. Recently
Bernanke and Gertler have studied the endogenous interaction between
the financial structure of firms and real economic activity with asym-
metric information on credit markets. They emphasize that owing to the
lemon's principle the induced increase of the cost of capital will weaken
the efficiency of the investment process. The authors put forward that
the equilibrium level of investments is positively related to the financial
structure of the firm, defined as net worth in relation to the debt-ser-
vice. Moreover according to the Stiglitz-Weiss analysis, the position of
the firm's balance sheet is also relevant with regard to a likely credit
rationing.
Bernanke and Gertler develop a model in which endogenous pro-cycli-
cal movements in the firm's net worth are strengthening fluctuations in
production and investment activity.'s They show how these fluctuations
with the connected development of cash-flows are positively related to
changes in the borrower's balance sheet-structure or his collateralizable
~s J. StigLitz and A. Weiss, The American Economic Review, June, 1981, op. cit.
p. 409.
4e B. Bernanke and M. Gertler, Financial fragility and economic períormance,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1990 and B. Bernanke and M. Gert-
ier, Agency costs, net worth and business fluctuations, The American Economic
Review, 1989, p. 14 - 31. See also J. Bisignano, Structures of financial intermedia-
tion, corporate finance end central banking, B[S, Basle, December, 1990 and B.
Bernanke en J. Campbell, "Is there a corporate debt crisis?" Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 1988, 1, p. 83 - 125.
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net worth. Therefore the wedge between the cost of capital in case of
external and internal finance is negatively correlated with the business
cycle, giving rise to volatility in investments. Higher cash-flows during
the upswing will give more room for internal finance and so relatively
lower costs of capital (no lemon's-premium) and vice versa. During
booms it becomes easier to borrow, agency costs of finance are relatively
low and the rise in internal net worth reduces the premium attached to
external finance. Conversely, in recessions the premium rises and it
becomes more difficult to obtain finance. With regard to the testable
implications of their model Gertler and Hubbard point out, "In contrast
to the frictionless neoclassical model, the framework here predicts that,
ceteris paribus, investment will vary across firms positively with differ-
ences in firm's internal net worth. Furthermore, this variation is likely
to be more pronounced in recessions than in booms".so Shortly, an
income-accelerator effect exists owing to the fact that increasing cash-
flows and an associated improvement of the financial structure of the
firm is weakening the terms of credit. This view also supports Fisher's
debt-deflation spiral in section 2. For a deterioration of the firm's
balance sheet because of an unexpected fall of the price level will reduce
its borrowing-capacity. Assuming that these firms belong to the group
with qualified investment projects, the redistribution of wealth owing to
the price deflation-process will result in a reduction of investments and
a contraction of economic activity.
Bernanke and Gertler emphasizing this cyclical interaction process
also make mention of a possible investment crisis. This view links-up
with the approach of Gurley and Shaw that the borrowing-capacity will
also determine the aggregate demand in the economy. Moreover in the
downturn of the cycle new borrowers will be faced with more restrictive
terms of credit than those firms with a high reputation on credit mar-
kets. For these high-rating firms have build-up credibility and reputa-
tion with regard to the performance of the loan contract, reducing the
information problem. In this way these firms can benefit from economies
of scale with regard to information-gathering by the lender. Analogous
to the operation of the signalling-effect in game-theory lenders also can
threaten to refuse future loans to stimulate borrowers to improve their
financial behaviour (reduction of the moral hazard-effect). In this way
lenders can contribute to increasing financial stability. For the informa-
tion that owing to a potential loss of credibility with regard to the per-
so M. Gertler and R. Nubbard, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1988,
op. cit. p. 58.
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formance of the loan contract and a possible cutting-off lending in the
future may work as a deterrent-strategy.
However some authors with contrasting viewpoints have argued that
the increasing reliance on debt by US-corporations in the 1980s has not
yet exposed the economy to any significant risk of financial fragility. In
this context Tensen emphasizes that debt reduces a company's "free
cash-flow", definecl as the excess of its cash flow over the amount of
funds that can be invested profitably within the firm. The availability of
free cash-flows may encourage managers to use these funds for ineffi-
cient expansion rather than for increasing payments to share holders.
Managers know that they will have to meet debt-service payments come
what may, so they will be disciplined giving them incentives to improve
efficiency. He also puts forward that the value created for investors in
leveraged buy-outs (LBO's) and other exchanges of debt for equities in
the last decade is a reflection of prospective gains in operating effi-
ciency. In the case of leveraged buy-outs these gains are due to the repla-
cement of the conventional large and often diversified corporate struc-
ture with the superior organizational form of management represented
by the "LBO association." He underlines that a higher debt level increas-
es managers' incentive to improve future corporate performance and will
signal this improvement to the financial market. In this context he
states, "Debt creation enables managers to bond their promise to pay out
future cash-flows ... the exchange of debt for stocks helps managers
overcome the normal organizational resistance to retrenchement that the
pay out of free cash flow often requires. The threat of failure to make
debt-service payments serves as a strong motivating force to make such
organizations more efficient".51 Financing through debt creation enables
firms to credibly commit to pay-out future cash flows. Debt also reduces
agency costs by diminishing the cash flow over which the firm can exer-
cise discretion. On the other hand the highly levered capital structure
itself will also reduce creditors' incentive to force liquidation of the firm
in the event that the expected efficiency gains and higher earnings do
not materialize. This implies that even if the firm fails cannot meet the
increased debt service payments the outcome is unlikely to be a tradi-
tional default and bankruptcy with its contractionary effects for the real
economy and the associated negative feed-back effects to the financial
system. Some other authors with contrasting views emphasize that the
Si M. Jensen, Takeovers: their causes and consequences, Journal of Economic
Issues, Winter, 1988, p. 29 - 30. See also M. Jensen, Agency costs of free cash flow,
corporate finance and takeovers, The American Economic Review, May, 1986,
p. 323 - 325.
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increasing indebtedness of both firms and household borrowers in the
eighties has represented no more than a continuation of trends that
already prevailed in the postwar period. Moreover most of the corpora-
tions which borrowed heavily during the last decade were industries
that are relatively insensitive to the business cycle.
V. Financial Fragility
The arise of bad-loans in the banking system and its attendant
increase in outstanding debt of firms and households, coinciding in time
with a cyclical downturn, has increased financial fragility. Basically this
development has been caused both by the rapid process of liberalisation
of financial markets in the eighties and the associated erosion of the
relative stable postwar financial structure with the connected problems
of banks in the United States, Great Britain and recently also in Japan
(commercial real-estate crisis). In the United States failures of commer-
cial banks and thrift institutions have reached levels not seen since the
Great Depression. Many of the conditions and the events of the eighties
have contributed to the fear of an impending major economic crisis. In
this context Wolfson points out, "... the observed financial instability in
the latter postwar period is a result of the interaction of two develop-
ments, one cyclical and the other secular".52 The cyclical forces leading
to financial instability were described in section 3, based on Minsky's
boom-bust cycle. But also secular and more longer-term developments
such as a new regulatory structure for financial institutions that encour-
aged excessive risk-taking have played a role as well. Guttentag and
Herring remark that conservative attitudes toward debt creation and
risk gradually began to change in the postwar period as memories of the
Great Depression faded and time went by without any great shocks to
the financial system.s3
In the new competitive deregulated financial environment of the eight-
ies and especially during the business-cycle expansion since 1982, US-
banks have changed their behaviour with regard to loans and invest-
ments substantially. For the maintenance of the Glass-Steagall Act
s2 M. Wolfson, The Post Keynesian Journal of Economics, Spring, 1990, op. cit.
p. 334. In this context see also F. Mishkin, Financial innovation and current
trends in U.S. Financial Markts, NBER, Working Paper, no. 3323, April 1990 and
B. Friedmnn, Views on the likelihood of financial crisis, Working Paper NBER,
no. 3407, August, 1990.
s3 J. Cuttentag and R. Herring, Credit rationing and Financial Disorder, Jour-
nal of Finance, December, 1984.
50fi Jac J. Sijben
(separation of commercial and investment banking) and the Mc Fadden
Act (no interstate banking), dating from the thirties, made it impossible
for the commercial banks to diversify their risks and to shift their activi-
ties geographically respectively. This implies that in this new competi-
tive financial environment US-banks were stimulated to accept more
risky but higher yielding investment projects to improve their declined
profitability and capital basis (financing leveraged buy-outs, speculative
rea)-estate projects and unsound loans). More opportunities for private
debt creation developed, and the relative importancé of government
securities in bank portfolios began to clecline. In the corporate sector
debt increased in relation to equity, the debt-maturity shortened and
liquidity declined deteriorating the financial strength of the ba)ance
sheets. Moreover the process of financial liberalisation has greatly
expanded alternatives to banks as sources of credit. Finance companies
and other nonbank institutions now compete with banks to meet firm's
financing needs, and commercial paper allows many firms to raise funds
directly from capital markets rather than through banks (securitisation).
During the recent economic downturn these financial developments
have resulted both in increasing financial fragility and in enlarging
bankruptcies. It can be stated that with high debt levels of many compa-
nies and households a c,yclical downturn like in the early nineties could
reveal a degree of fragility in both the real and the financial sectors that
has remained effectively hidden by the long cyclical upswing in the eight-
ies. This view links-up with Fisher's debt-deflation spiral and Minsky's
financial instability-hypothesis with regard to the debt-accumulation
during the boom of the business cycle. An excessive borrowing becomes
dangerous when at the peak of the cycle the interest rate rises and eco-
nomic activity starts to fall. Then the higher leverage-ratio of the firms
may increase the risk of default, sharpening the conseqttences of a reces-
sion with feed-back effects to the financial sector. In these circumstan-
ces the overall stability of the economic and financial system is at issue.
In this context Wolfson puts forward, "Thus the financial crisis is best
understand as an endogenous reaction to the increasing fragility that
develops over the course of the business cycle expansion".5~ In his em-
pirical pioneering study about the influence of financial structure of the
US-non financial corporate sector on the real economy during the
1946 - 1987 period he assumes that the most import influence in both the
s~ M. WolJson, The Post Keynesian Journal of Economlcs, Spring 1990, op. cit.
p. 337. See also J. Faust, Will higher corporate debt worsen tuture recesslonT
Review Federal Reserve Bank ot Kansas City, March - April, 1990.
Credit Markets, Financial Fragility, and the Real Economy 507
cyclical and secular analysis was the increase in financial fragility. The
financial fragility of the non financial corporate sector, expressed by dif-
ficulty in meeting debt repayment commitments, played a major role and
was transmitted to the banking system by means of increased defaults on
bank loans. As financial fragility variables he took the ratio of corporate
net interest payments to gross capital income on the one hand and the
ratio of net loan losses to average loans outstanding in the banking
sector on the other hand. The higher these ratios the more fragile is the
condition of the corporate sector and the banking system respectively
and vice versa. It appears that financial fragility exhibits a strong cycli-
cal pattern, rising in recessions, overlaid on a secularly rising trend,
which has steepened significantly since the mid-seventies.55 In this con-
text Driscoll concludes, "Even if high levels of private sector debt do
increase the fragility of the financial system and this is reflected in
greater instability in financial markets, it is not clear that this has made
the real sgctor of OECD economies more unstable in the 1980s or that
the real sector will be more prone to instability and recession in the
future (p. 22).
US-monetary authorities are worried about the increased financial
vulnerability of the firms because it is weakening the implementation
and effectiveness of monetary policy. Friedman argues that in the last
few years the weakening of corporations' balance sheets has increased in
such a way that the Federal Reserve is not able through monetary tight-
ening to eliminate a possible rekindling of inflation. For in these cir-
cumstances there is a fear for either causing a recession or sharpening
an already set going fall in economic activity.5e The increased likelihood
of debtor distress during a recession could reduce the central bank's
tolerance for allowing a business downturn, thus becoming less agressive
in pursuing anti-inflation policies. Moreover increased debt could also
intensify the effect of a recession. US-monetary policy became relatively
tight near the peak of the expansion at the end of the eighties, followed
in the early nineties by monetary expansion to bottom-out the lasting
ss M. Wolfson, The Post Keynesian Journal of Economics, Spring, 1990, op. cit.
p. 347 - 348. See also M. Driscoll, Deregulation, credit rationing, financial fragil-
ity and economic performance, OECD, Working Papers, February, 1990, p. 21 - 22.
Davis has examined the relationship between private sector debt~income ratios
and loan default risk in major OECD countries. See E. Davis, Rising sectoral
debt~income ratios; A cause tor concern, BIS Economic Papers, no. 20, 1987.
se B. Friedman, Occasional Paper 29, Group of Thirty, New York, 1989. See also
H. KauJman, Debt and financial stability: an overview, in Debt, Financial Sta-
bility and Public Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August, 1986.
508 Jac J. Sijben
recession. Therefore authorities were faced by a reputation trade-off:
either maintaining their credibility with regard to price stability or
accepting a recession with the fear of an associated increase of financial
instability because of excessive debt-financing in the eighties.
Without doubt the availability of a lender of last resort to avoid a pos-
sible financial crisis and to calm market fears by supplying liquidity to
the market (like the Fed in 1987), may give rise to moral hazard mani-
festing by banks' acceptance of higher-risk investment projects. The
banks will be encouraged to take more risk because they feel that policy
makers are oriented toward preventing significant adverse consequences.
This behaviour will also be stimulated by the socalled "too-big-to-fail-
doctrine" that appears to guide government policy. In this way the Fed-
eral Reserve tries to prevent a possible disturbance of the payments
system with negative spill-over effects to other banks and the real econ-
omy. For widespread failures of the interconnected depository institu-
tions are likely to threaten directly the entire financial system. On the
other hand both the insured and the uninsured depositors will not be
encouraged to monitor the credit activities of the banks accepting the
higher risks. In these circumstances a small crisis, resulting in the
default of some banks may have positive signalling-effects. However
Kindleberger has shown that financial crises without a lender of last
resort have been followed by greater depressions than in cases of a crisis
with the intervention of the central bank to supply markets with ]iquid-
ity.57 In any case a safety-net will be necessary to preclude the develop-
ment of a debt-deflation induced recession envisaged by Fisher during
the Great Depression. In this context the forced Penn Central bank-
ruptcy in 1970, the problems with Drexel-Burnham and Lambert and the
collapse of the Junk-bonds market (1989) are very illustrative. The last
event was caused by the fact that investors became aware of the genuine
risks on this market changing their behaviour dramatically. Federal
regulators also were sensibly unwilling to add further moral hazard,
signalling market participants that the junk bond market might deterio-
rate financial stability.
The last few years banks in the United States and also in Japan and
Great-Britain were very active in improving their balance sheet positions
by cost reductions, shortening their balance sheets by securitisation of
assets and by strengthening their capital basis. This behaviour also
results in reluctancy with regard to extending new loans and in sharpen-
s7 C. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A history of financial crises,
New York,1978.
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ing the terms of credit because the banks were experiencing increasing
severe losses on the outstanding loans. However the slowing of bank
credit expansion is also determined by a more cautious attitude towards
borrowing, as firms and households have reacted to the elevated levels of
debt accumulated during the eighties. It is quite obvious that this credit
or capital crunch coinciding in time with a slowdown in economic activ-
ity will not foster real and financial stability. It provokes fears that a
credit crunch would be an additional drag on a slowing economy sharp-
ening the recession.SP
VI. Concluding ftemarks
This essay deals with an overview of the theoretical developments
about the interactions between financial markets and especially the
credit market on the one hand and the course of economic activity on the
other hand. Moreover attention is also directed both to the importance of
the financial structure of corporations and households and the associa-
ted weakening of the balance sheets of financial institutions for econom-
ic and financial stability. In the last decade the economic process has
been driven very strongly by the drastical changes on financial markets
(capital, interest and exchange rate movements). The deregulation and
especially the internationalisation of financial markets has created quite
a new, highly competitive, financial environment. Therefore analysing
issues both in the field of corporate finance and monetary economics
starts from the central angle of reflection, the operation of the global
financial markets.
It may be concluded that until recently the interaction between the
operation of credit markets and macroeconomic performance has not
been moved to centre-stage in economic literature. It was Fisher during
the Great Depression and authors like Gurley, Shaw, Tobin and Minsky
in the postwar period who analysed the meaning of non-bank financial
intermediaries, the importance of credit-availability and the consequen-
ces of excessive debt-financing for the course of the real economic pro-
cess. However in macroeconomic models only the development of two
key financial variables, namely the money stock and the rate of interest,
were still emphasized neglecting the operation of financial markets.
58 P. O'Brien and F. Browne, A"credit crunch"? The recent slowdown in bank
lending and its implicatíons for monetary policy, OECD, Working Papers, no. 107,
1992 and A. Wojnilower, The central role ot credit crunches in recent financial
history, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1980.
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During the seventies this one-sided approach changed gradually. Based
on the economics of information and the new microeconomics in the
eighties the importance of the quality of bank loans and the creditwor-
thiness of borrowers became very crucial in analyses to explain pheno-
mena like credit rationing and the increased financial fragility. In this
context the agency and adverse selection problems provide additional
mechanisms for effects from this fragility on macroeconomic perform-
ance.
The modern approach about the interaction between the operation of
financial markets and the real economy (Bernanke, Gertler, Stiglitz,
Weiss, Greenwald etc.) underlines the role of the credit market for the
course of economic activity. Based on asymmetric information and the
associated agency problems these authors point out that financial mar-
kets are not transmitting mechanically savings to investments. Owing to
the existence of asymmetric information between the lender and the bor-
rower quite new problems have been come about. The information prob-
lems find expression by the working of adverse selection and moral
hazard, resulting in credit rationing and weakening the interest rate as a
transmission channel in monetary policy. This means that investment
activity may change substantially without alterations in the rate of inter-
est. Other financial variables like the borrowers' reputation or credit-
rating and the financial structure of the firm will determine investment
behaviour and the business cycle. According to Akerlof's lemon prin-
ciple, under certain circumstances the operation of financial markets
may be deteriorated generating credit rationing and even equity-ration-
ing. It is obvious that in these cases, opposite to the Modigliani-Miller
theorem, the financial structure really will influence the entrepreneur's
investment decisions. In this context Greenwald and Stiglitz remark,
"Not only is the informal notion of the importance of the strength of a
firm's financial position validated in these imperfect information models,
but they also provide a mechanism for the propagation of macroeconom-
ic disturbances and the persistence of their effects."sa
The issues of adverse selection and moral hazard also play a role with
regard to central bank supervision to protect the depositors who entrust
their money to the banks. The insurance of bank deposits aims at a cur-
tailment of a possible panic with depositors which may result in a severe
s9 B. Greenwafd and Stèg[itz, The American Economic review, May, 1990, op. cit.
p. 163. See also J. Stiglitz and B. Creenwald, Intormation, Finance and Markets:
the architecture o[ allocative mechanisms, NBER, Working Paper no. 3652, March,
1991.
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classical bank-rtin.s" Iiowever the moral hazard-effect and the associ-
ated agency problem comes about when the existence of deposit-insurance
may stimulate banks to increase their risk-taking. The banking and
thrift industries know that in case of non-performing loans the deposit-
insurance corporation wil] always be available as a'safety-net', giving
them incentives to change their behaviour in taking risks. On the other
hand this 'safety-net' or helping hand will guard against a rapid bank-
run in case of a shock confidence of market participants. Moreover no
depositor necds worr,y about the banks' lending policies. In this context
also the adverse selection-efíect is at work, encouraging bad borrowers
to offer more risky investment projects.
During the last decade both effects connected with deposit-insurance
have contributed to a smooth involvement of US-banks in risk,y activi-
ties, weakening the structure of their balance-sheets. In this way the sta-
bility of the American financial system has been reduced. Moreover the
financial fragilit,y further increased owing to the fact that the insurance-
corporations themselves were faced with a lack of resources. Therefore
the US-financial system has to be submitted to the market-discipline.
Recently Greenspan in an address to the Congress has pointed out very
clearly, "With depositors exercising insufficient discipline through the
cost of deposits, the incentive of some banks' owners to control risk-
taking has been dulled. Profits associated with risk-taking accrue to
owners, while losses in excess of bank capital that would otherwise fall
on depositors are absorbed by the FDIC"s! The Fed-chairman advocates
a differentiation of insurance-premiums both to influence banks' behav-
iour with regard to risk-taking activities and to avoid the associated
moral hazard problem. In this context he remarks, "A promising
approach that seeks to simulate market discipline with minimal stability
implications is the application of risk-based deposit insurance premi-
ums. The idea is to make the price of insurance a function of the bank's
risk, reducing the subsidy to risk-taking and spreading the cost of insur-
ance more fairly across depository institutions".G2 This idea could be
implemented for example by limiting the amount of deposit insurance
(now ~ 100000) or by linking the premium to the potential credit-risk. It
is also possible to make a distinction between insured and uninsured
e" In this context mention can be made of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (F.D.I.C.) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporations
(F.S.L.I.C.)in the United States.
sl A. Greenspan, Statements to the Congress, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Septem-
ber, 1990, p. 731.
eZ A. Greenspan, Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1990, op. cit. p. 733.
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deposits with a risk-adjusted deposit-rate. Then the depositor can choose
where to place his deposit and the deposit-rate will reflect the risk he is
willing to take. In this way the central bank may be able to realize a
balance between stability and efficiency of the financial system and to
contribute to a strengthening of the solidity and credibility of the system
as a prerequisite for stability in the real economy.
Some years ago the Bank for International Settlements ( BIS) took the
initiative to stimulate central banks to consult and cooperate internation-
ally also aiming at a sharpening of the control of banking institutions
to safeguard the stability of the financial system.83 In 1988 The Commit-
tee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (Cooke Commit-
tee) has designed internationally comparable risk-based capital-ade-
quacy ratios (80~0) for the banks to be introduced in 1993. In the near
future it will appear whether the supervisors will succeed in controlling
the consequences of the revolution on financial markets in the eighties
by a coordinated design of a new adequate framework of supervision
aimed at a stronger banking industry in an era of more freedom. In this
context of the overall tendency to make greater room for market disci-
pline alongside official prudential supervision the BIS concludes. "Above
all, reducing incentives to excessive risk-taking will depend on the cred-
ibility of the authorities' commitment to limiting intervention to the
necessary minimum in the event of turmoil. In much the same way as the
monetary authorities' anti-inflation commitment, it needs to be demon-
strated in consistent action.""' The robustness of the financial system
can be maintained by stable government policies and an institutional
environment that encourages sufficient diversification of risks, reducing
the risk of future economic and financial crises.
Appendix
Equilibrium Credil Rationing
The diagram below shows how credit rationing can be consistent in
theory with a market equilibrium because of market imperfections. As
described in section 4 the quality uncertainty of loans arising from asym-
metry in information between lenders and borrowers gives rise to two
63 See in this context A. LamJalussy, The restructuring of the financial indus-
try: a central banking perspective, SUERF Papers on Monetary policy and [inan-
cial systems, no. 12, Tilburg, 1992.
e~ BIS-Annual Report, 1991, p. 212.
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problems, namely moral hazard (adverse incentives) and adverse selec-
tion.fis
Essentially there are four quadrants to this diagram showing a theoreti-
cal set of relationships between the loan rate (rL), charged to the len-
ders, and the expected return to an individual bank (ER) on the one








The demand for loans, which is negatively related to the loan rate, is
depicted in quadrant I. Quadrant II shows the relationship between the
loan rate and the expected return on loans or the profitability of bank
lending (PB), implied by the Stiglitz-Weiss asymmetric information anal-
ysis. As the loan rate increases the line PB initially rises showing that
the expected return to the bank increases. After the loan rate (rL') is
reached, however, the PB-line begins to fall back again. This is because
a further rise in the loan tends to crowd out some risk averse "good"
borrowers (adverse selection) and to encourage other borrowers to
undertake high yielding but risky investments (moral hazard). So al-
though each loan that is repaid earns the bank a higher return, the
number of bad loans rises sharply. As a result, the expected return to the
bank actually falls as the loan rate rises after the level (rL' ).
es See M. Driscolf, OECD, Working Papers, February, 1990, op. cit. p. 34.
I
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Quadrant III describes the normal positive relationship between the
expected return on loans and the supply of loans (L,). The 45-degree
line in quadrant IV allows to derive the backward bending loan supply
schedule to be constructed in quadrant I. The diagram shows that for the
loan rate (rL') and the associated expected return to the bank (ER),
there is a credit rationing equilibrium with an excess demand for loans
(H). As can be seen the Walrasian equilibrium (Ls - Lp) is at a loan
rate (r~'). But this is not an equilibrium for banks would be operating
below peak expected returns and could maximise profits by cutting the
loan rate back to (rL'). As long as H~ 0, the volume of loans will be
determined by the ]ender and the borrowers will be rationed.
Zusammenfassung
Uie Kreditmërkle, die Fragilitdl des Finanzsystems
und das qesamtwirtschaflliche Ergebnis
Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die derzeit in der modernen Literatur auftauchenden
Fragen bezilglich der Auswirkungen von Kreditmarktvorgdngen sowie der Fragili-
t~t des Finanzsystems auf das gesamtwirtschaftliche Ergebnis einer LJberprtlfung
zu unterziehen. Diese neue Literatur stellt stark auf Wirtscha[ilichkeitsaspekte
von Intormationen und au[ Anreize filr explizit motívierte Friktionen aut den
Kapitalm~rkten ab. Wenn man mit den traditionellen Ansichten tiber die Wechsel-
beziehungen zwischen der Finanzstruktur von Unternehmen und der privaten
Haushalte mit dem Konjunktunyklus beginnt (Schuldendeflationierungsspirale
nach Fisher und finanzielle Instabilit8ts-Hypothese nach Minsky), schenkt man
den asymmetríschen Informationen besondere Aufinerksamkeit, die wegen der
nicht vorhandenen Perfektion der Kreditm~rkte bestehen. Wegen eben dieser Exi-
stenz asymmetrischer Informatinnen auf diesen MSrkten und der damit verbunde-
nen Probleme geben Fragen bezilglich ungilnstiger Auswahl und moralischer
Bedenklichkeit Anlali zu Ph~nomenen der Gleichgewichlskreditrationierung und
wertpapiermk(iigen Unterlegung von Verbindlichkeiten (Greenwald-Stiglitz und
Bernanke-Gertler), wodurch der Zinssatz als Transmissionsriemen der Geldpolitik
geschwkcht wird. Schliel3lich werden die von einer qualitativen Verschlechterung
der Bilanzen des Nichtbankensektors und von einlagennehmenden Instituten auf
das gesamtwirtschaftliche Ergebnis und die Stabilit~t gekennzeichneten Auswir-
kungen der hbheren Fragibilitgt des Finanzsystems in den 80er Jahren untersucht.
Es schliel3en sich einige Anmerkungen zur Aufgabe der Zentralbanken hinsicht-
lich der Wahrung der Stabilit~t und der Integritat des gesamten Finanzsystems
an.
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Summary
Credit Markets, Financial Fragility, and lhe fteal Economy
The purpose of this paper is to give a review oí the current issues in modern
literature about the impact both of credit markets and financial fragility on
macroeconomic pertormance. This new literature borrows heavily írom the eco-
nomics of information and incentives to explicitly motivate frictions in capital
markets. Starting with the tradilional views about the interrelationship between
the financial structure ot corporations and households and the business-cycle
(Fisher's debt-deflation spiral and Minsky's financial instability-hypothesis), spe-
cial attention is given to the asymmetric information-approach with regard to
imperfections on credit markets. Owing to the existence of asymmetric informa-
tion on these markets and the associated agency problems, the issues of adverse
selection and moral hazard give rise to the phenomena of equilibrium-credit
rationing and securitisation, (Greenwald-Stiglitz and Bernanke-Gertler) weaken-
ing the rate of interest as a transmission channel in monetary policy. Finally the
impact of the increased financial fragility in the eighties, characterized by a dete-
rioration of the quality of the balance sheets of the non-financial sector and
depository instilutions, on macroeconomic performance and stability is analyzed.
Some remarks are made on the task of central banks to safeguard the stability
and soundness ot the whole financial system.
Itésumé
Marchés du Crédit, Fragilité Financière et 1'Economie Séele
Le but de cet article est de présenter un examen critique des analyses faites
dans la littérature moderne de 1'impact des marchés financiers ainsi que de la [ra-
gilité financière sur les résultats macroéconomiques. La nouvelle littérature
emprunte tortement aux économies de 1'information et des stimulants pour expli-
quer les tensions sur les marchés des capitaux. En prenant comme point de départ
les vues traditionnelles sur I'interdépendance entre la structure financière des
entreprises et des ménages et le cycle des affaires (la spirale déflation dette de
Fisher et 1'hypothèse de 1'instabilité financière de Minsky), on accorde une atten-
tion particulière à 1'approche assymétrique de 1'information concernant les imper-
fections des marchés financiers. Par suite de 1'existence d'informations assymélri-
ques sur ces marchés et des problèmes dérivés des agents, les résultats de la sélec-
tion défavorable et du risque moral font surgir les phénomènes du rationnement
du crédit d'équilibre et de titrisation (Creenwald-Stiglitz et Bernanke-Gertler),
attaiblissant le taux d'intérét comme canal de transmission dans la politique
monétaire. Finelement, 1'auteur de cet article analyse I'impact de la fragilité
financière accrue dans les années 80, caractérisée par une détérioration de la qua-
lité des bilans du secteur non financier et des institutions de dépóts sur les résul-
tats et la stabilité macroéconomiques. Quelques remarques sont faites sur la táche
des banques centrales en vue de sauvegarder la stabilité et la solidité de tout le
syslème íinancier.
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